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ONCE MORE, WITH FEELING: 
THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS” ACT AND THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF SUBPART F 
 
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1 
Nir Fishbien2 
 
For the first time since 1913, Congress is considering abandoning the principle that 
US residents should be subject to tax on all income “from whatever source derived.”3 
Specifically, the proposed tax reform legislation, the so-called “Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act”, would completely exempt from US taxation dividends from “Controlled Foreign 
Corporations” (CFCs).4 This is therefore a good occasion for considering the reasons 
we tax such dividends in the first place. 
 
When the modern income tax was adopted in 1913, it was clear that as a 
jurisdictional matter the US could not tax non-residents on foreign source income.5  
While US residents are subject to tax on all income “from whatever source derived” 
under the provisions of IRC sections 1 and 11, in the case of non-residents, IRC 
sections 2(d) and 11(b) limit the tax to US source income.6 That, plus the definition 
of a US resident corporation as a corporation incorporated in the United States, 
meant that the income tax did not apply to a foreign corporation earning foreign 
source income even if it was 100% controlled by a single US shareholder.7 
 
By the 1930s, it became clear that this situation was untenable, because 
Congressional hearings revealed that wealthy US individuals used “incorporated 
                                                        
1 Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, the University of Michigan. 
2 S.J.D. candidate, the University of Michigan. 
3 IRC section 61; US Constitution, Amendment XVI.  
4 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, H.R. 1 (Nov. 2, 2017) (TRA17), section 4001. 
5 This view has since been relaxed for foreign corporations controlled by US 
residents. See Avi-Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 Tax L. Rev. 483 
(2004). 
6 IRC section 2(d): In the case of a nonresident alien individual, the taxes imposed by 
sections 1 and 55 shall apply only as provided by section 871 or 877. IRC section 
11(d): In the case of a foreign corporation, the taxes imposed by subsection (a) and 
section 55 shall apply only as provided by section 882. 
7 If we had adopted the UK definition of residence as where the corporation is 
managed and controlled from, this situation would frequently have resulted in the 
corporation being a US resident. This is still the best remedy against inversions, 
especially if combined with a corporate exit tax to deter moving the headquarters.  
There are no inversions in Europe because they adopted both measures. If we 
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pocketbooks” in tax havens to accumulate income offshore and avoid US tax. In 
some cases, they then gave up their US citizenship and moved abroad to enjoy the 
accumulated income. Congress responded by enacting the Foreign Personal Holding 
Company (FPHC) provisions (IRC 551 et seq.), which taxed the profits of a FPHC if it 
had over 60% passive income and was controlled by five or fewer US individuals.8 
However, Congress was careful not to violate the basic jurisdictional limitation by 
taxing the FPHC directly (unlike its domestic cousin the Personal Holding Company, 
which was subject to tax at the top individual rate but at the corporate level). 
Instead, Congress invented the deemed dividend concept, under which the 
controlling shareholder was deemed to receive a dividend from the FPHC and was 
taxed on the dividend.9 This provision was upheld against a constitutional 
challenge.10  
 
In 1961, the Kennedy Administration proposed extending the deemed dividend rule 
to all the income of CFCs operating in developed countries. The reasons cited by the 
Administration included (a) capital export neutrality (CEN), a new concept invented 
by economists in the 1950s; (b) the need to preserve the US balance of payment 
position against too many dollars flowing out as foreign direct investment (FDI); 
and (c) the need to protect the US corporate tax base from income shifting.11  
 
Of these three reasons, the first is problematic and the second is obsolete. CEN is 
problematic because in recent years many economists have raised doubts on its 
importance in comparison to Capital Import Neutrality (CIN) or Capital Ownership 
Neutrality (CON).12 The balance of payments issue is obsolete because since the US 
abandoned the gold standard in 1971 it does not care about how many dollars are in 
foreign hands because it can always print more.13 
                                                        
8 The FPHC regime was repealed in 2004 as redundant with PFICs (1986).  
9 See Avi-Yonah, The Deemed Dividend Problem, 4 J. Taxation Global Transactions 
33 (2004), also in Proceedings of the National Tax Assoc. Annual Meeting (2004). 
10 Eder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 138 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1943). 
11 See President Kennedy’s Tax Message to Congress, April 20, 1961, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8074, reprinted in part below. 
12 See Hines, "Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income." Tax L. Rev. 62, no. 2 
(2009): 269-98; Hines, Desai and Foley, "Taxation and Multinational Activity: New 
Evidence, New Interpretations." Surv. Current Bus. 86, no. 2 (2006): 16-22. 
13 In any event, the mere use of tax laws to address the balance of payments 
problem was, to a certain extent, problematic, as more immediate and flexible tools 
could have been more responsive to the problem: “From a more general standpoint, 
various questions can be raised about the United States approach of considering the 
tax laws from a balance of payments and foreign economic policy standpoint... More 
immediate and flexible tools may be more responsive to policy needs. Thus, most of 
the European countries, during the period when they experienced balance of 
payments difficulties, resorted to direct controls such as capital and exchange 
controls. The United States reluctance to resort to direct controls makes it necessary 
to consider indirect tools, such as the tax Jaws, but the question can be asked 
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This leaves the third reason: protecting the US corporate tax base from income 
shifting. The first author has previously argued that this was the main impetus 
behind the Kennedy Administration’s push to abolish deferral.14 This view can now 
be supported by a remarkable report from the Stanley Surrey papers at Harvard 
Law School. 
 
This report is dated March 10, 1961, a little over a month before President 
Kennedy’s tax message to Congress (April 20, 1961). It was forwarded to the new 
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Stanley S. Surrey from IRS Commissioner 
Mortimer Caplin. The report explains some of the problems encountered by the IRS 
in the international arena, including “problems relating to the retention of foreign 
profits abroad, including (a) accumulation of earnings by operating companies and 
(b) accumulation of earnings by base companies in tax haven countries.” It then goes 
on to explain why this was a problem: 
 
The consensus of the task force is that under our basic philosophy of 
taxation, United States taxpayers with foreign income should be taxed as 
much as the United States taxpayer with similar domestic income for reasons 
of equity among taxpayers and the prevention of tax avoidance. This 
view is consistent with the idea that income taxes are imposed on a concept 
of ability to pay and where income is received from any source, the ability to 
pay is not different merely because the source of income may be from a 
foreign area.  … It is our view that the first objective should be an attempt to 
achieve equality between the taxation of domestic and foreign income. 
This is based on the thought that tax preferment, even for the most laudable 
purposes, always gives rise to attempts on the part of some to avail 
themselves of such preferment when their operations are without real 
purpose. This automatically gives rise to questions of avoidance and evasion. 
This in turn obviously makes the administrative job more difficult.15   
 
The task force then goes on to recommend limits on deferral, namely “add new 
section 951 et seq. to provide for a foreign personal holding company type tax on all 
earnings and profits of a base company controlled by a small number of US 
shareholders.”  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
whether other countries which have used direct controls do not have adequate 
means to solve their problems so that it would not be necessary on economic 
grounds to consider the tax laws in this respect”. See Stanford G. Ross, Report on the 
United States Jurisdiction to Tax Foreign Income, 49b STUD. ON INT’L FISCAL L. 
184, 217 (1964). 
14 Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International 
Taxation, 25 Virginia Tax Rev. 313 (2005). 
15 Stanley Surrey papers, Harvard Law School library, box 175-2b (emphasis added). 
The document is reproduced in part below. 
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What is remarkable is that here there is no mention at all of either neutrality (of any 
kind) or the balance of payments. Instead, the proposed Subpart F (with the correct 
Code section) is based entirely on preventing income shifting.  
 
We can now compare this to President Kennedy’s message to Congress on April 20, 
1961: 
 
III. TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INCOME 
 
Changing economic conditions at home and abroad, the desire to achieve 
greater equity in taxation, and the strains which have developed in our 
balance of payments position in the last few years, compel us to examine 
critically certain features of our tax system which, in conjunction with the tax 
system of other countries, consistently favor United States private 
investment abroad compared with investment in our own economy. 
 
1. Elimination of tax deferral privileges in developed countries and "tax 
haven" deferral privileges in all countries. Profits earned abroad by American 
firms operating through foreign subsidiaries are, under present tax laws, 
subject to United States tax only when they are returned to the parent 
company in the form of dividends. In some cases, this tax deferral has made 
possible indefinite postponement of the United States tax; and, in those 
countries where income taxes are lower than in the United States, the ability 
to defer the payment of U.S. tax by retaining income in the subsidiary 
companies provides a tax advantage for companies operating through 
overseas subsidiaries that is not available to companies operating 
solely in the United States. Many American investors properly made use of 
this deferral in the conduct of their foreign investment. Though changing 
conditions now make continuance of the privilege undesirable, such change 
of policy implies no criticism of the investors who so utilize this privilege. 
 
The undesirability of continuing deferral is underscored where deferral has 
served as a shelter for tax escape through the unjustifiable use of tax 
havens such as Switzerland. Recently more and more enterprises 
organized abroad by American firms have arranged their corporate 
structures--aided by artificial arrangements between parent and subsidiary 
regarding intercompany pricing, the transfer of patent licensing rights, the 
shifting of management fees, and similar practices which maximize the 
accumulation of profits in the tax haven--so as to exploit the multiplicity of 
foreign tax systems and international agreements in order to reduce sharply 
or eliminate completely their tax liabilities both at home and abroad. 
 
To the extent that these tax havens and other tax deferral privileges result in 
U.S. firms investing or locating abroad largely for tax reasons, the efficient 
allocation of international resources is upset, the initial drain on our 
already adverse balance of payments is never fully compensated, and 
4
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profits are retained and reinvested abroad which would otherwise be 
invested in the United States. Certainly since the postwar reconstruction of 
Europe and Japan has been completed, there are no longer foreign policy 
reasons for providing tax incentives for foreign investment in the 
economically advanced countries. 
 
If we are seeking to curb tax havens, if we recognize that the stimulus of tax 
deferral is no longer needed for investment in the developed countries, and if 
we are to emphasize investment in this country in order to stimulate our 
economy and our plant modernization, as well as ease our balance of 
payments deficit, we can no longer afford existing tax treatment of foreign 
income. 
 
I therefore recommend that legislation be adopted which would, after a two-
step transitional period, tax each year American corporations on their 
current share of the undistributed profits realized in that year by subsidiary 
corporations organized in economically advanced countries. This current 
taxation would also apply to individual shareholders of closely-held 
corporations in those countries. Since income taxes paid abroad are properly 
a credit against the United States income tax, this would subject the income 
from such business activities to essentially the same tax rates as 
business activities conducted in the United States. To permit firms to 
adjust their operations to this change, I also recommend that this result be 
achieved in equal steps over a two-year period, under which only one-half of 
the profits would be affected during 1962. Where the foreign taxes paid have 
been close to the U.S. rates, the impact of this change would be small. 
 
This proposal will maintain United States investment in the developed 
countries at the level justified by market forces. American enterprise abroad 
will continue to compete with foreign firms. With their access to capital 
markets at home and abroad, their advanced technical know-how, their 
energy, resourcefulness and many other advantages, American firms will 
continue to occupy their rightful place in the markets of the world. While the 
rate of expansion of some American business operations abroad may be 
reduced through the withdrawal of tax deferral such reduction would be 
consistent with the efficient distribution of capital resources in the 
world, our balance of payments needs, and fairness to competing firms 
located in our own country. 
 
At the same time, I recommend that tax deferral be continued for income 
from investment in the developing economies. The free world has a strong 
obligation to assist in the development of these economies, and private 
investment has an important contribution to make. Continued income tax 
deferral for these areas will be helpful in this respect. In addition, the 
proposed elimination of income tax deferral on United States earnings in 
5
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industrialized countries should enhance the relative attraction of investment 
in the less developed countries. 
 
On the other hand, I recommend elimination of the "tax haven" device 
anywhere in the world, even in the underdeveloped countries, through the 
elimination of tax deferral privileges for those forms of activities, such as 
trading, licensing, insurance and others, that typically seek out tax haven 
methods of operation. There is no valid reason to permit their remaining 
untaxed regardless of the country in which they are located.16 
 
Here we have all three reasons- CEN (“efficiency”), balance of payments, and 
preventing income shifting/equity, with significant emphasis on the last one. This is 
consistent with the task force report as well as a later memorandum by Surrey 
(1962) we have published that agrees under pressure to limit the proposal just to 
tax haven operations that facilitate income shifting from the US.17  
 
However, when Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon came to present the proposal to 
the House Ways and Means Committee on May 3, 1961, his statement emphasized 
balance of payments and CEN, not anti-avoidance: 
 
To avoid artificial encouragement to investment in other advanced countries 
as compared with investment in the United States, we propose that American 
corporations be fully taxed each year on their current share in the 
undistributed profits realized by subsidiary corporations organized in 
economically advanced countries…  
 
While it is difficult to estimate quantitatively by how much tax deferral has 
contributed to the balance of payments deficit, it has surely been a 
significant factor…Today, our situation is such that we must look first to the 
more immediate balance of payments results…It may be estimated, 
although very roughly, that the elimination of the deferral privilege for 
subsidiaries in advanced countries and for tax haven operations in all 
countries would improve our balance of payments position by as much as 
$390 million per annum… 
 
While relief for the balance of payments is an important reason for 
discontinuing tax deferral, it is not the only one. There exists, in addition, an 
important issue of equity which has a significant bearing on domestic 
employment and production…With the present deferral privilege, an 
American firm contemplating a new investment and finding cost and market 
conditions comparable at home and abroad is impelled toward the 
investment opportunity overseas… 
                                                        
16 Kennedy Tax Message, supra (emphasis added). 
17 Avi-Yonah, Territoriality and the Original Intent of Subpart F, 155 Tax Notes 1581 
(June 12, 2017), 86 Tax Notes Int’l 1009 (June 12, 2017). 
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It is sometimes contended that if US firms are to compete successfully abroad 
they must enjoy as favorable a tax treatment as their foreign competitors. I 
believe that this argument has been overly stressed…But even if this 
argument were fully valid, it could not be a decisive objection to our 
proposal. As long as the tax systems of various countries differ- and I venture 
to predict that this will be the case for years to come- we must make a form 
choice. Either we tax the foreign income of US companies at US tax rates and 
credit income taxes paid abroad, thereby eliminating the tax factor in the US 
investor’s choice between domestic and foreign investment; or we permit 
foreign income to be taxed at the rates applicable abroad, thereby removing 
the impact, if any, which tax rate differences may have on the competitive 
position of the American investor abroad. Both types of neutrality cannot be 
achieved at once. I believe that reasons of tax equity as well as reasons of 
economic policy clearly dictate that in the case of investment in other 
industrialized countries we should give priority to tax neutrality in the choice 
between investment here and investment abroad.18   
 
The National Foreign Trade Council, the lobbying arm of US-based multinationals 
(NFTC) in its 1999 critique of Subpart F emphasizes this statement much more than 
the President’s tax message, because Dillon argued for abolishing deferral almost 
entirely in the name of balance of payments and economic neutrality considerations, 
with preventing income shifting almost entirely absent.19 This was of course 
convenient, because the NFTC could then present abolishing deferral as based 
entirely on discredited or obsolete arguments.20 But the document we reproduced 
                                                        
18 President’s Tax Message along with Principal Statement…Submitted by Secretary 
of the Treasury Douglas Dillon…Committee of Ways and Means, House of 
Representatives (May 3, 1961) (emphasis added).  
19 NFTC report, 1999: President Kennedy’s 1961 proposals reversed Treasury’s 
previous reluctance to endorse current taxation of foreign income and explicitly 
embraced capital export neutrality, due, in substantial part, to concerns with the U.S. 
balance of payments situation at the time…When he introduced the Treasury’s 
specific suggestions for ending deferral, Secretary Dillon framed his suggestions 
largely in terms of capital export neutrality… The importance of capital export 
neutrality as a motivation for the proposal emerged most clearly in Secretary 
Dillon’s preemptive strike against those who he predicted would argue that the end 
of deferral would undermine the competitive position of U.S. firms operating 
abroad… 
20 NFTC, 1999: By July 1961, the Treasury had retreated from its insistence on a 
general anti-deferral regime. Treasury then offered a more modest proposal that 
aimed to address only the use of tax havens. Treasury’s new position marked its 
abandonment of a policy of capital export neutrality in U.S. international tax law and 
also was the beginning of the transformation of the Kennedy proposals into “anti-
abuse” provisions…The major shift recommended by the Kennedy Administration, 
to a general policy of capital export neutrality had been rejected…It is clear that 
7
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above shows clearly that a policy of abolishing deferral could be based entirely 
on anti-avoidance considerations, without the need to invoke either the 
balance of payments or CEN.  
 
The multinationals predictably objected in the name of competitiveness, and 
Congress agreed, even though at the time US multinationals dominated the world 
                                                                                                                                                                     
neither the House nor the Senate embraced the Kennedy Administration’s call to 
shift U.S. international tax law to a policy of capital export neutrality. Instead, the 
1962 legislation, as ultimately enacted, was targeted at eliminating certain “abuses” 
permitted under prior law. The historical record, however, is far from clear about 
exactly what the “abuses” were that Congress intended to curb…The lack of clarity 
in the historical record of the 1962 Act about what constituted an abuse of tax 
deferral in international transactions has resulted in ongoing debates about the 
proper scope of subpart F that continue to this day. As subsequent chapters show, 
legislation since 1962 has changed the rules for when current taxation is required, 
but has not resolved the basic debate that raged in 1962. Moreover, interpretations 
of the 1962 Act subsequent to its enactment have sometimes described as abusive 
any transaction where a foreign government imposes lower tax than would be 
imposed by the United States on the same transaction or income.65 This cannot be 
right. In 1962, Congress clearly rejected making capital export neutrality the 
linchpin of U.S. international tax policy. Attempting to force a strained interpretation 
of the legislation it did enact into an endorsement of capital export neutrality by 
defining anything that departs from capital export neutrality as an abuse flagrantly 
disregards the historical record. 
 
65 See Stanford G. Ross, Report on the United States Jurisdiction to Tax Foreign 
Income, 49b STUD. ON INT’L FISCAL L. 184, 212 (1964). 
 
Interestingly enough, Ross, in the same 1964 report cited by the NFTC, stated that 
“[t]he United States 1962 legislation was primarily based on considerations of tax 
equity and providing neutrality in the tax treatment of foreign investment. At the 
same time, balance of payments and foreign economic policy objectives were in 
accord with these bases for change and so reinforced the case for change to a more 
equitable and neutral tax law in this area”. See Ross, Report on the United States 
Jurisdiction to Tax Foreign Income, supra. It should also be noted that in the same 
report, Ross argued that the principle of "tax neutrality" had three major roots. The 
first of which was that “on grounds of equity, an American earning a dollar in 
Europe should pay the same tax as an American earning a dollar here at home”. The 
second of which was economic and balance of payments considerations and the 
third was based on the ground of eliminating tax abuse “which undermined the 
integrity of the tax system” (emphases added). This is near contemporaneous 
evidence by a participant in the deliberations, and thus entitled to greater deference 
than the NFTC Report. 
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(18 of the top 20 MNEs were American).21 Thus we got the Subpart F compromise 
under which passive income and base company income were taxed currently while 
active income continued to enjoy deferral. The Administration agreed because in 
1962 it was hard to earn active income in low tax jurisdictions, so allowing deferral 
did not mean a strong incentive to shift.22  
 
Subpart F operated more or less as intended until 1997, as shown by constant 
pressure by the multinationals through 1997 to relax its terms, e.g., by (a) 
abolishing IRC section 956A,23 (b) providing that a CFC cannot be a PFIC,24 (c) 
introducing the active software royalties and active finance (banking and insurance) 
exceptions.25 In 1999, the NFTC issued a blistering attack on Subpart F and 
demanded abolishing the base company rule.26 However, “check the box” (adopted 
in 1997) was already doing its destructive work in undermining Subpart F27, and by 
2004, when the Republicans had control of the White House and both houses of 
Congress, they passed legislation (the “American Jobs Creation Act”) that was a 
Christmas tree laden with gifts for the multinationals without touching what 
remained of Subpart F. Then, as a final blow, IRC section 954(c)(6) was enacted in 
2006 to make it difficult for a future Democratic Administration to revoke check the 
box.28  
                                                        
21 NFTC Report, 1999: “Competitiveness concerns were therefore central to the 
debate when subpart F was enacted in 1962, even at a time when U.S.-based 
companies dominated the international marketplace. In that year, 18 of the 20 
largest companies in the world (ranked by sales) were headquartered in the United 
States, but this apparent dominance did not convince Congress that the competitive 
position of U.S. companies in international markets could be ignored. Thus, although 
the Administration originally proposed the acceleration of U.S. taxation of most 
foreign-affiliate income, that proposal was firmly rejected by Congress based largely 
on concerns about its competitive impact.” On this report see Avi-Yonah, Tax 
Competition and Multinational Competitiveness: The New Balance of Subpart F, 18 
Tax Notes Int'l 1575 (April 19, 1999). 
22 This is based on the statements of David Tillinghast reported in Avi-Yonah, U.S. 
Notice 98-11 and the Logic of Subpart F: A Comparative Perspective, Tax Notes Int’l 
(June 8, 1998). 
23 IRC 956A, enacted in 1993 and repealed in 1996. 
24 IRC 1297(d)(1) (1997). 
25 IRC 543(a)(1)(C); IRC 954(h) (1997). 
26 The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century 
(1999). 
27 See Notice 98-11 (January 16, 1998), explaining how Treasury realized how check 
the box could be used to undermine Subpart F, and proposing to limit its application 
in the international arena. For an evaluation, see Avi-Yonah, Notice 98-11, supra.  
28 Which indeed they did not do when they had the majority in 2009-11. See Avi-
Yonah, President Obama’s international tax proposals could go further, Columbia 
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So now we are in 2017, the GOP again controls the entire government, and tax 
reform is on the table once more. The main focus has by now moved to the $2.6 
trillion accumulated by the multinationals in low tax jurisdictions. The main goal of 
the NFTC and its allies is to ensure that this immense pile can be repatriated without 
too much tax (since they have mostly not taken a reserve against future tax on that 
income) and that future earnings can likewise be repatriated tax-free. Hence the 
proposal to overturn the “all income from whatever source derived” rule and 
permanently exempt dividends from CFCs.29 
 
As Surrey would have predicted, the evisceration of Subpart F by check the box and 
954(c)(6) has led to an immense accumulation of profits in low tax jurisdictions. 
Moreover, just as he was concerned would happen, most of this pile stems from IP 
developed (with the costs of development deducted) in the United States. For 
example, Apple’s $230 billion in Ireland stem from the sales of devices whose value 
depends primarily on IP developed in Cupertino.30  
 
What would happen if we adopt territoriality? The impetus to shift would be even 
stronger, because there will no longer be any reason to worry about being able to 
repatriate offshore profits. The resulting accumulations will dwarf even the $2.6 
trillion, just like the $2.6 trillion dwarf the $300 billion repatriated in the 2004-5 
amnesty.31  
 
But, the Republicans say, what about the anti-profit shifting provisions in TRA17? 
There are two major provisions. The first, section 4004, imposes a 14% tax on past 
accumulations of cash or cash equivalents, and 7% on illiquid assets, payable over 
eight years.  
 
This is higher than some observers have expected, given that most MNEs do not 
have a tax reserve for such payments on permanently invested income. However, 
there are three reasons to doubt the efficacy of this provision. First, given that by 
definition past accumulations have no impact on either efficiency or 
competitiveness, the rate should have been higher (35% of $2.6 trillion is $910 
billion, which would have offset much of the deficit increase from other provisions 
of TRA 17). Second, because the multinationals were aware that this provision is 
                                                        
29 Avi-Yonah, Proposed Tax Plan Is Ripe for Abuse, The Century Foundation 
(October 27, 2017), https://tcf.org/content/commentary/proposed-tax-plan-ripe-
abuse/ 
30 For Surrey’s original views see the document reproduced in Avi-Yonah, 
Territoriality, supra. 
31 On the 2004 amnesty see Avi-Yonah, The Silver Lining: The International Tax 
Provisions of the American Jobs Creation Act—A Reconsideration, 59 IBFD Bulletin 
27 (2005). Note that TRA17 keeps many of the current provisions that encourage 
profit shifting such as IRC 954(c)(6) that is made permanent (section 4204) and the 
active financing exception to Subpart F (section 4301). 
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coming, they had ample opportunities to convert liquid to illiquid assets. Third, even 
worse, the provision depends on accumulated E&P, and there are transactions that 
can be used to “vaporize” E&P (e.g., IRC 304 transactions). 
 
But this is just a transition issue. The main problem is the anti-shifting provision for 
future income, section 4301. Under that section, if a US parent corporation has 
“foreign high returns”, defined as the aggregate return of its CFCs that exceeds 7% 
plus the Federal short term rate on the CFCs aggregate adjusted bases in 
depreciable tangible property (the “trigger rate”), then it is subject to an immediate 
inclusion of 50% of its foreign high returns, i.e., an effective tax rate of 10%, 
regardless of whether the earnings are repatriated. 
 
Once again there are several reasons to doubt the effectiveness of this provision as 
an anti-shifting device. First, obviously 10% is better than 20% (the rate on 
domestic US income), and given the availability of the dividend exemption, there 
would be an incentive to shift profits in the knowledge that they can be repatriated 
at any time. Second, current foreign tax credits are available to offset the 10% tax, 
although only for 80% of foreign taxes paid, so there will be some double taxation.  
Third, the trigger rate will shield some multinationals more than others. Ironically, 
the more tangible assets you have offshore, the higher your trigger rate, so 
companies like Apple or GE that actually make things offshore will do much better 
than companies like Microsoft, Google or Amazon. This will be an inducement to 
move jobs (not just profits) offshore.  
 
Moreover, section 4301 will have another perverse effect- it will induce inversions. 
If a company successfully inverts, it will not be subject to the foreign high return 
inclusion, and will be able enjoy zero tax on those like under current law, as 
opposed to up to 10%.  
 
There are several inbound provisions in TRA17 that are supposed to deter 
inversions. For example, under section 3301, net interest in excess of 30% of 
EBITDA will not be deductible. This rule is necessary to prevent negative tax rates in 
conjunction with expensing (section 3101) and the active foreign dividend 
exemption (section 4001). But (a) some interest will still be deductible, and (b) even 
though “no deductions for expenses properly allocable to an exempt 
dividend…would be taken into account,” money is fungible, so that negative effective 
tax rates can be expected.  
 
Moreover, even though the interest allowance is lower than current IRC 163(j) 
allows, it reduces the effective US tax rate from 20% to 14%, and so an inversion can 
result in a US rate of 14 and a foreign rate of 0, instead of a US rate of 20 and a 
foreign rate of 10 under 4301 without an inversion. 
 
The other major inbound provisions are a limit on interest expense that does not 
allow the US subsidiary to be leveraged more than 10% over the leverage of its 
worldwide group (section 4302) and a new excise tax of 20% on deductible 
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payments other than interest paid by a US corporation to a related foreign 
corporation (section 4303). The first does little to limit interest expense since the 
worldwide group can be leveraged as much as it wants. The excise tax can be 
avoided if the related foreign corporation chooses to treat the payments as ECI 
subject to 20% tax. 
 
The excise tax certainly looks formidable on paper and is sure to enrage our treaty 
partners, who will see it as an indirect way to impose a withholding tax on royalties 
(contrary to article 12 of the tax treaties) as well as violating the arm’s length 
standard of article 9 (because the excise tax applies to cost of goods sold between 
related parties, implying that it is inflated, regardless of what unrelated parties 
would have agreed upon).32 But the excise tax is also vulnerable to avoidance. Most 
importantly, if the foreign corporation chooses to treat the payments as ECI, it gets 
to deduct amounts “determined by reference to the profit margins reported on the 
group’s consolidated financial statements for the relevant product line.” This 
suggests deductions for royalties as well as cost of goods sold will continue with no 
excise tax and no reference to arm’s length comparables (which frequently do not 
exist).  
 
In addition, the excise tax only applies to deductible payments to related parties. An 
inverted multinational can sell as much as it wants directly to US customers or to 
unrelated US distributors and it will avoid the excise tax. Therefore, inversions will 
continue, and TRA17 does not have any of the anti-inversion provisions that 
have been suggested (e.g., redefining corporate residence by location of 
headquarters and imposing a corporate exit tax analogous to IRC 877A).  
 
TRA17’s international provisions will therefore do little to prevent the kind of profit 
shifting that Subpart F was enacted to prevent. We should go back to the original 
intent of Subpart F and subject foreign income to the same rate as domestic 
income.33 We do not care too much what that rate is, although we believe the 
effective rate of our competitors is above 20% so 20% would preserve 
competitiveness.34  But the absolute key is to have the same rate on all income, 
domestic and foreign, because as the IRS task force wrote in 1961, “tax preferment, 
even for the most laudable purposes, always gives rise to attempts on the part of 
                                                        
32 Query how the excise tax can be defended in the WTO. On its face, it would seem 
to violate either GATT II:1(b) [as an unscheduled charge on importation that is not 
an "ordinary customs duty"], or GATT III:2 [as a discriminatory internal tax, if it is 
regarded as a tax on the internal sale to the subsidiary that just happens to be 
collected at the border]. The interaction between TRA17 and tax treaties deserves a 
separate paper.  
33 This would, of course, take care of the lock out issue that animates the dividend 
exemption proposal. 
34 Avi-Yonah and Lahav, The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest US and EU 
Multinationals, 65 Tax L Rev 375 (2012). We should also include anti-inversion 
provisions as suggested above. 
12
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 143 [2017]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/143
some to avail themselves of such preferment when their operations are without real 
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